Reunification Day Strikes a Reconciliatory Tone
The Party takes a welcome step towards healing historical wounds
There is palpable patriotism in the Vietnamese air at the moment. Those lucky enough to be there will see the national flag hanging from every window. Designed following an uprising against French occupation in Cochinchina, it illustrates the historical roots of the country: the five-pointed yellow star represents the main classes in Vietnamese society, i.e. intellectuals, farmers, workers, entrepreneurs, and soldiers, while the red of bloodshed and revolutionary spirit fills the background. Nationalist symbols tinted military demonstrations, drone shows and fireworks, as Vietnam celebrated the 50th iteration of a pivotal moment in its history.
On April 30th, 1975, the last American helicopters left Saigon, marking the end of the “Vietnam War” (or the American War, as referred to in Vietnam). The Vietnamese government officially designates the day as “The Liberation of the South and National Reunification Day”, ending what it saw as the illegal American occupation of South Vietnam. Yet this claim is not universally accepted. Having fled the fallen Republic of Vietnam (RVN) due to fears of retribution or prosecution, many overseas communities refer to April 30th as “National Humiliation Day” (Lễ Quốc Nhục) or “Black April” (Tháng Tư Đen). Hard feelings have been mutual. Many Vietnamese in the Fatherland retort through terms like “National Helicopter Swinging Day” (Ngày Đu Càng), mocking those that clung onto departing U.S. helicopters.
Surprisingly, the Vietnamese Communist Party has sought to strike a reconciliatory tone in its grandest celebrations. As one of the few foreign reporters allowed into the country at the time, Brian Barron of the BBC described what was the surprisingly benign atmosphere following reunification: “so far we have seen the velvet gloves of the Hanoi communists”. Now, in the midst of global turbulence in political relations, the Party once again recognises the need to apply a soft touch.
To Lam, Vietnam’s Secretary General, mentioned little of defeating the “puppet regime” in his speech, the phrase used by official Vietnamese government records to describe the RVN. Nor were there antagonistic jibes towards the United States, which had recently enacted a ban on its officials from attending the celebrations under directions from President Trump. Rather, Lam’s main emphasis was on the hardships undergone by those having lived through the war on both sides, highlighting the sanctity of peace and the remarkable development that has taken place since national independence. “Vietnam is one, the Vietnamese people are one,” the Secretary proclaimed, echoing the words of Ho Chi Minh.
Politically, this pragmatic approach is consistent with the country’s adherence to “bamboo diplomacy”, a doctrine characterised by ideological non-alignment. As the United States adopts an increasingly isolationist tone, Vietnam’s leader has shown a commitment to retain diplomatic links with its largest export partner: following Trump’s announcement of tariffs, for instance, To Lam was one of the first to personally call the U.S. President, promising to lower internal tariffs on American imports. However, the inclusion of Vietnam's friends in China, Laos, Cambodia and Cuba also demonstrates an allegiance to its roots, as well as in becoming a “reliable partner for every country in the world”.
Lam’s talk of national unity is another detail in a list of government efforts to improve its relations with Vietnamese abroad . The Ministry of Justice has recently implemented a draft law that would ease the requirements for overseas Vietnamese to obtain citizenship, and in some cases allow for dual citizenship. Furthermore, the Politburo’s Resolution 36-NQ/TW also commits to making it easier for overseas Vietnamese to work and invest in Vietnam. On the demand side, 71% of Vietnamese professionals now express a desire to return to the country, among the highest in Southeast Asia. This manoeuvre makes economic sense. Many second-generation Vietnamese, having spent the entirety of their lives abroad, no longer remember the war nor hold the associated resentment. They carry with them skills and knowledge that counteracts many of Vietnam’s largest obstacles to development, including brain drain, an ageing population and undersupply of highly skilled workers. Moreover, as the nation seeks to become a regional player, it is imperative to maintain goodwill with its diaspora, who can provide important links with nations around the world.
Most importantly, I argue, a focus on reconciliation will allow for a healthy and productive nationalism. It is imperative to be empathetic to the supposed “enemies” of the nation, and to reduce the frequency of “us vs them” thinking. Only through acknowledging the pain felt by all sides can the nation truly move towards the future.
Like many dynasties and governments before it, the Communist Party has sought to assert its legitimacy as the rightful ruler of the country. As Benedict Anderson argues, nationalism works through arranging the past into linear events that places the current regime’s position at the end of an unfolding sequence. For example, ancient Chinese rulers invoke the Mandate of Heaven and pick up customs from previous dynasties. Modern day Turkey claim to be the descendant of the Ottoman Empire, even as other nations can equally make such assertions. In both cases, the current government projects itself into the past to legitimise the present. Military parades and other symbolic gestures are tools a state can use to fold the messy processes of identity formation into a linear narrative.
An inevitable part of creating an imagined community is the erasure of other visions. In his new book, Against Progress, Slavoj Zizek turn to a scene in the Prestige to explain this mechanism. Here, a magician squashes a cage with a bird inside, before opening his hand and showing that it had managed to escape; however, in the following scene, we can observe that the first bird had actually been squashed. The point made is that in any notion of progress, sacrifices are to be made elsewhere but shielded from public view. In China, claims to be natural rulers run counter to the fact that there have been many fiefdoms, dynasties and warlords all with their own ideas of what China has and should be which all had to be put down. Similarly, one cannot talk about Vietnamese identity without mentioning its domination by the practices of the Kinh majority ethnic group and the exclusion or subsumption of those from minority backgrounds. A Vietnamese socialist-nationalism vision also competed and won against the parallel capitalist-nationalism that existed in South Vietnam.
However, this recognition of the violent process of uniting the Vietnamese nation and state does not need to relativise all viewpoints as equally legitimate. The Viet Minh’s ascension was preconditioned on the very real fact that they were the force that liberated the country from French rule, and had a referendum been held, Ho Chi Minh would likely have united the country through peaceful means. This granted the party immense ideological firepower and helped power its recruitment drive. The Party had then a stronger claim than most to be the representation of Vietnamese nationalism.
Instead, the purpose of understanding the logic of nation-building is to recognise the casualties of progress. In uniting the country, Vietnamese killed Vietnamese, brothers killed brothers. The question of what ideology Vietnam should follow was arguably more of shaped by imperial influences, and far exceeding the demands for those in the country to be united through peace. It was with this ideal that the Party covered the celebration as one of peace and unity; it would be beneficial to Vietnamese people at home and abroad to also do the same.